Illustrated advertising cards African stereotypes as foils in order to appeal to white consumers
After decades of presenting the archetypal American consumer as white and female, advertisers are slowly broadening their imagery to include more diversity.
But, as the scholar Marilyn Maness Mehaffy writes, the history of race in American advertisements isn’t just about the absence of non-white buyers.
She argues that the creation of the ideal white, female consumer in the expanding consumer economy of the late nineteenth century depended on the inclusion of women of other races, particularly African-Americans, as a foil.
Mehaffy focuses on illustrated advertising cards. In the late nineteenth century, consumer brands printed the colorful cards to spread awareness of their products. Both children and adults saved the cards, leading to a collector’s craze.
The domestic, white, female consumer is defined in relation to a complementary preindustrial black laborer.
Some cards simply depicted animals, flowers, or landscapes. But one archivist found up to forty percent of the cards in a typical museum collection invoked ethnic stereotypes. In particular, Mehaffy writes, a striking number of illustrated cards depicted a pair of women:
one white and one Black.
In one card advertising cotton thread, for example, a modestly dressed white woman sewing in her chair is juxtaposed with a black woman in short sleeves laboring in a cotton field.
The domestic, white, female consumer is defined in relation to a complementary preindustrial black laborer.
Similarly, Mehaffy notes, a number of the cards depicted a white women, sometimes with her children, at home beside a black servant. One, advertising the Redwood Portable Range, offers a striking contrast between a caricatured black domestic worker with bulging eyes and a statuesque white women in a gown. The servant is evidently an important part of the scene of domestic consumption, offering her employer advice about which stove to buy.
Other cards explicitly tie consumer products to white femininity. A card for Hunter’s Flour & Meal Sifters contrasts “the old way” of sifting flour—illustrated with a black woman laboring over a large sieve—and “the new way”—a white women effortlessly using the modern tool.
A fold-out card advertising the Eclipse Clothes Wringer shows two versions of a scene with a white woman supervising a Black domestic worker doing the wash.
In the first, the servant has her sleeves rolled up and is wringing the clothes out by hand. In the second, the black woman—now using the mechanical clothes wringer—is dressed more primly and is less muscular, with thinner lips and “whiter” features (thought the text still shows her speaking in a caricatured black dialect). The consumer product seems to imply that making the African-American woman more like her white counterpart is an “improvement.”
Mehaffy argues that the contrast between white and black women helped define the role of race in the post-Civil War era, as the country became increasingly industrialized.
Later, images of black people in consumer branding dwindled to a few prominent, and still problematic, characters like Aunt Jemima, leaving advertising a mostly white space through much of the twentieth century.
Imperialism, Revolution, and Industrialization in 19th-Century Europe
Industrialization takes hold in Western Europe
Imperialism, Revolution, and Industrialization in 19th Century Europe Explained
Throughout 19th-century Europe, political and economic forces helped to dramatically alter the European continent that forever changed the countries and people that inhabited them. In less than a century, the absolutist ideals of the Old Regime started to wither away as revolutionary ideals of freedom and democracy attempted to take hold across Europe.
Industrialization, with its powerful economic connections, greatly fueled these revolutions through the development of both social strife and inequality. Moreover, nationalist sentiment and imperialism directly contributed to these changes by promoting racism and competition between the powerful emerging nation-states. As this article seeks to demonstrate, however, revolution, industrialization, and imperialism did not always follow a consistent or steady pattern. Rather, they differed quite significantly depending upon the country and people involved during their progression.
As a result, Europeans experienced uneven and sporadic waves of change across the long nineteenth century. What accounts for these discrepancies? What factors contributed to the differences that each country experienced regarding revolution, industrialization, and imperialism during this era?
Revolution and Nationalism
Revolutions in Europe greatly varied from each country to the next. To understand how they affected nineteenth-century Europe, however, it is important to first define the term, “revolution.” Revolution is a term that conjures up many definitions. Generally speaking, it involves a fundamental shift or change within society that alters the social, political, or economic ideals of a country and its people.
Similarly, historian Norman Rich asserts that the term describes any “transformation” of society that takes place over “a long period of time” (Rich, 1). To be certain, Charles Breunig proclaims that this type of change does not always include a clear “break with the past” (Breunig, xi). Basic elements of the society often remain in the aftermath of revolutions.
The goals, ideals, and beliefs of the people, however, are often forever changed through the revolutionary process. This is precisely the situation that unraveled within Europe during the nineteenth-century and the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.
As Breunig asserts:
“many traditional institutions and ideas persisted through the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras into the age of the Restoration” (Breunig, xi).
While basic tenets of European society and culture remained intact, the liberal ideas unleashed by the French Revolution, nevertheless, served to greatly challenge the established monarchies and aristocracies of Europe.
In their aftermath, these challenges to authority set the stage for future governments more responsible to their people, rather than governments that relied solely on absolute rule.
Moreover, the revolutions of nineteenth-century Europe ushered in democratic virtues of liberty and equality that later evolved into the current models of governance in existence today. With this basic understanding of revolutions and their impact on nineteenth-century Europe, several important questions arise.
What accounted for these revolutionary uprisings?
Specifically, what factors led to their overall development and progression?
Why did differences in the experiences of revolution exist among the countries of Europe? More specifically, why did certain regions of Europe experience change more rapidly than other parts?
The revolutions across Europe directly resulted from the radical views of the French that first emerged during the French Revolution.
In an attempt to dismantle the ideas embraced by the Old Regime, French revolutionaries (inspired by the American Revolution only a few years prior) attacked the social and political ideals of their time in favor of measures that ostensibly favored universal equality and liberty for all.
With the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and his conquests across Europe, these French ideas quickly spread to neighboring regions as country after country fell victim to Napoleon’s powerful army.
This aspect is important to consider, as it helps explain the inconsistencies between Eastern and Western Europe in regard to the revolutions each country experienced.
Western powers with a closer proximity to France, experienced revolution far sooner than the countries of Eastern Europe since their populations existed within the boundaries of French influence.
This influence was further enhanced once Napoleon gained control over Italy, the German states, and portions of Austria-Hungary through his conquests. As part of his rule, Napoleon implemented tremendous changes within these countries, both economically and politically.
The Napoleonic Codes, according to Breunig, destroyed the prior political establishments of these countries, and in their place, implemented policies that mimicked “French institutions” (Breunig, 93).
Because the imperial structure set up by Napoleon destroyed the social and political elements of the Old Regime across Western Europe, Napoleon set the stage for future revolutionary developments within these countries that progressed more rapidly than in places such as Russia.
Napoleon’s conquests also spread ideas of nationalism that emerged from the French Revolution. Nationalism, which reflected ideas of extreme patriotism and pride, played a tremendous role in developing the revolutionary changes that occurred across Europe.
Nationalism provided individuals with an identity, and a connection with people of similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds. By conquering the countries and states surrounding France, Breunig proclaims that Napoleon, inadvertently, “contributed to a greater sense of unity” among those he conquered, particularly within the Italian and German states (Breunig, 94).
Through his harsh and dictatorial rule, Napoleon aroused “patriotic resentment among the peoples subjected to French domination” (Breunig, 95). This is important to consider, since these sentiments did not vanish over time.
Even decades after the fall of Napoleon and the French Empire, Breunig asserts that “the seeds sown during the Napoleonic era bore fruit in the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century” (Breunig, 95).
This case is greatly illustrated by the German states during the middle years of the nineteenth-century. Although Germany did not form into a collective nation-state until the time of Bismarck, Breunig proclaims that discontent in the 1840s helped invigorate the patriotic seeds first sown by Napoleon into “a wave of popular discontent” across the German states, particularly within Prussia (Breunig, 238).
For these reasons, Western Europe experienced upheavals of their political and social systems far sooner than the countries of the East.
These disruptions and encouragement of nationalist sentiment, consequently, aided in the development of revolutionary thoughts long before such ideas emerged in the East. Distance, in this sense, greatly explains the revolutionary incongruities that existed throughout Europe during the nineteenth-century. Eastern countries remained far removed from the dissent fomenting in the West.
Moreover, distance gave the Eastern rulers ample time to implement measures capable of stifling and muting future dissenters, thus, preventing revolutionary reactions within their own countries.
According to Marc Raeff, Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, “worked hard to prevent Western liberal ideas from gaining a foothold with the educated public” (Raeff, 148).
As he states:
“censorship was extremely severe: anything suspicious or capable of being interpreted as adverse criticism of the existing state of affairs was proscribed” (Raeff, 148). Not surprisingly, such tactics and actions helped to greatly delay radical Western ideas from permeating the Russian empire.
Nevertheless, Western elements of revolution and nationalism did eventually infiltrate the East during Napoleon’s invasion of the Russian Empire. Similar to his conquests in the West, Napoleon inadvertently introduced concepts of the French Revolution to the vast forces he encountered. Therefore, understanding Napoleon’s impact is important because it helps to explain multiple aspects about revolutions in Europe.
Not only does it demonstrate why an unevenness of revolutions existed within Europe, but it also explains the root causes of nationalism and why nationalist sentiment spread beyond the French boundaries to impact European societies at large.
The revolutionary and nationalist sentiments introduced by Napoleon, in turn, aided in the disruption of the balance of power across Europe, and directly resulted in the tense military and political atmosphere that emerged following the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
Political and institutional changes, however, are not the only revolutions that took place across Europe. Industrialization, to a large degree, brought economic change to Europe on a scale never before seen. Just as the political revolutions of Europe varied from country to country, so too did the forces of industrialization that favored particular social, economic, and political environments over others.
Industrialization
According to Charles Breunig, the Industrial Revolution “transformed the lives of Europeans even more thoroughly than did the French Revolution” (Breunig, xii). But what factors contributed to its impact? According to Norman Rich, advancements in agriculture served as a major contributor to industrialization since it resulted in “greater availability of food in Europe,” and aided in the growth of population across the continent (Rich, 15).
This growth in population was important since it assisted in the development of cities and provided a consumer market to meet the large-scale production capabilities of industry. Revolutions in transportation and technology, such as the railroad and steamboat, further aided the development of industrialization since they provided a means for consumer goods to be shipped in mass quantities quickly and cost-effectively, across long distances.
As Rich states:
“the railroads made possible…the large-scale, economical, and rapid distribution of goods overland, they penetrated the remote interiors of countries and continents and opened up the markets of these regions to industry while giving agricultural regions access to urban markets” (Rich, 9).
Similar to the political revolutions taking place across Europe, industrialization varied greatly across the European continent. In Great Britain, for instance, the effects of industrialization were, perhaps, most recognizable since the British Empire fostered an atmosphere conducive to industry and its effects.
With an empire that stretched the globe, Britain possessed a large and diverse population, as well as a vast consumer market that helped stimulate the production of mass quantities of goods. Furthermore, Charles Breunig asserts that part of the intensity with Britain’s industrialization lies with the fact that its empire possessed large quantities of “raw materials,” a large quantity of “capital for investment,” and “surplus labor” sources that did not exist on this scale within the rest of the European continent (Breunig, 198-199).
According to historian, Anna Clark, however, the Industrial Revolution also created as many problems as it solved in Great Britain. This is particularly true if the social impact of the revolution is taken into account.
While the Industrial Revolution provided many individuals with jobs and an abundance of goods, Clark asserts that it also served to create social strife and gender inequality, and greatly expanded the divide between social classes (Clark, 269-270).
As she states:
“the social changes of industrialization drove up illegitimacy rates between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth century, and wife desertion and bigamy seemed all to frequent” (Clark, 6).
Moreover, while Clark asserts that the “new opportunities” created by the Industrial Revolution “lessened poverty,” they also “increased divisions between men and women, as men worked in heavy industry and women either found jobs in the declining textile industry or stayed at home” (Clark, 270). Problems such as these greatly helped fuel the social and political revolutions taking place across Britain, and eventually Europe, at large.
Consequently, the social strife created by industry resulted in many of the problems seen in the last half of the nineteenth-century, particularly within Russia and the eventual Soviet Union.
Industrialization within France and Austria also provided similar effects, although not nearly as pronounced as the British example. According to Breunig, industrialization greatly aided in the modernization efforts within France.
However, as he states, their “persistence of a system of small landholding” greatly “handicapped the development of industry” when compared with Great Britain (Breunig, 199).
In regard to Austria, Norman Rich explains: “the industrial revolution brought to Austria the usual problems of city growth…but it also brought wealth and prosperity to a large section of the population and created a new middle class” (Rich, 106).
Like the other continental countries, however, Austria faced material shortages and a smaller-scale consumer market that paled in comparison to Great Britain.
Eastern Europe and Russia, in particular, did not experience the full effects of industrialization like Great Britain, France, and Austria until later into the nineteenth-century.
With its isolated position in Europe, Russia once again possessed a natural barrier to many of the changes sweeping across the continent.
Many of the institutions and policies of Russian governance continued to reflect the absolutist ideals espoused by the Old Regime, even into the twentieth-century. Serfdom, which amounted to basic elements of slavery, continued unabated until the 1860s in Russia.
As a result of this dependence on agriculture and the labor of serfs, Russia did not begin its modernization and industrialization policies until the late nineteenth-century (well after the industrial revolutions of Western Europe).
Fearful of encroachment and destruction by the hands of the Western powers, Russia sought to catch up to the industrialized and technologically advanced West only because its national interests were at stake.
With the unification and militarization of Germany during the 1860s and 1870s, such fears do not appear erroneous, especially when the aggressiveness of German military policies are taken into account.
The failure of Russia to industrialize later, rather than sooner, created many problems for the Russian Empire as it attempted to transition too quickly from an agricultural-based society to industry.
By diverting their attention away from agriculture too rapidly, the Russian Empire experienced social strife and economic problems that eventually led to its downfall, following World War I.
As seen, industrialization varied greatly between the powers of Europe since it required multiple factors for its success.
Nevertheless, its effects greatly impacted the European continent in a profound manner through the tremendous innovations it inspired in both technology and production. As a result, Europe advanced faster and more quickly than at any other time period in its history.
More importantly, however, industrialization helped cultivate and contribute to the rising social and political strife originally inspired by the French Revolution. Through its creation of imbalances in social class, gender, and wealth, industrialization helped set the stage for many of the social problems that existed in the latter part of the nineteenth-century that continued well into the twentieth-century as well.
Imperialism
Similar to the political, social, and industrial revolutions, discrepancies in the policies of imperialism varied across Europe as well. Ostensibly, imperialism expanded and grew as a result of the European desire to spread Christianity to the so-called heathen societies of the world, and as a means to bring civilization to the undeveloped tribes and clans of the globe.
As Mark Cocker asserts: Europeans believed “Christian civilization was the obvious apex and terminal point to which all mankind must inexorably aspire” (Cocker, 14). More often than not, however, imperial sentiments derived from a deeply racist view of indigenous people whom the Europeans viewed as inferior to their culture and way of life.
Because native traditions and practices did not reflect Christian elements of Europe, Cocker asserts that Europeans often viewed tribal societies as “subhuman” animals that lived outside “the margins of civilization” (Cocker, 13).
Imperialism also derived from a desire to acquire greater resources and raw materials for the various European economies.
In this essence, imperialism emerged, in some aspects, as a direct result of the industrial revolutions taking place across Europe during the nineteenth-century. Elements of nationalism also served to fortify imperialism, and greatly inspired the desires for global colonization.
Nationalism, with its ideas of patriotism and ethnic superiority, contributed to imperial ideas since it inspired competition among Europeans who desired greater national glory and pride.
The spirit of nationalism and imperialism, combined, prompted Europeans to expand their influence and territory through the domination of foreign lands and people. By scrambling to the far corners of the world to establish colonies, such ambitions aided in the construction of vast empires meant to compete with and overshadow rival European countries.
The creation of these empires resulted in immense competition and conflict between the Europeans that directly contributed to the intricate alliance systems of the late nineteenth-century, and the eventual outbreak of World War I in 1914.
Because of these competitive aspects, historian Isabel Hull states, “imperialism was war” (Hull, 332).
Not surprisingly, the ambitions for colonies and empires were not well founded, as the colonies cost far more to maintain than their actual worth. The brutal subjugation of foreign subjects further exacerbated these problems since these policies were often met with fierce resistance from locals who aimed to disrupt and harass the conquering European powers.
As a result of these problems, Europeans approached the issues of colonization in many of the same ways. Large-scale exterminations, mass-reprisals, and brutality all figured into the European methods of dealing with unruly natives. Nevertheless, some countries implemented more extreme measures than others for the sake of showing their military might and demonstrating their power to effectively control their subjects.
As Hull states, part of the prestige in possessing an empire is the ability to maintain order and discipline. When rebellions by natives succeeded, however, it “exposed the weaknesses of the colonizers” to their European rivals (Hull, 332). This element of imperialism is important to understand, as it helps to explain the different ways that European countries explored and experienced colonization in the nineteenth-century.
While a large portion of the European powers scrambled to take possession of colonies across the world, both Great Britain and France took control of the most colonies due to their economic and military strengths (Cocker, 284). Great Britain, with its tremendous naval power and global empire, was perhaps best suited for imperial endeavors, as it possessed the financial and military means to subjugate large foreign populations with relative ease.
Countries such as Belgium, Italy, and Germany, however, all experienced imperialism on a far different and smaller scale as they each struggled greatly to maintain security over their lesser territories. Because of this reason, smaller countries like Germany, which unified under Bismarck in the 1860s and 1870s, were forced to counter these setbacks through the implementation of brutal and often extreme tactics over their colonial subjects.
These tactics, largely similar to the British treatment of Aborigines in Tasmania and Australia, helped Germany maintain its status as a world power at the expense of the native Herero people of Southwest Africa.
The German example is particularly interesting since their imperial ambitions involved a level of aggressiveness not easily matched by the other European countries. More importantly, however, the German example also provides an excellent illustration of the differences, and long-term effects that imperialism had on Europe. Of particular interest is the point made by Isabel Hull regarding future conflicts in Europe.
Hull makes the point that German aggression in Southwest Africa directly resulted from its extreme military culture that pervaded all elements of its society. With no social and political oversight, the German military, essentially, acted without any real constraints on its power (Hull, 332). Thus, as a result of their success with colonization during the nineteenth-century, Hull asserts that the military extremism developed from imperialism helped inspire German aggression for World War I only a few decades later (Hull, 237).
Such ambitions, in turn, led to Germany’s ultimate destruction in the waning moments of the First World War. These ambitions are not strictly limited to Germany either. In one form or another, imperialism directly influenced future warfare and aggression of the other European powers as well, and contributed greatly to the tumultuous and conflict-driven twentieth-century.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the revolutions of the nineteenth-century dramatically transformed Europe’s social, political, and economic spectrums in a profound manner. While they certainly varied across the continent in their intensity and overall impact, all of Europe eventually succumbed to forces that destroyed the ideals of the Old Regime. As a result of the changes in politics and economics, the revolutions of the nineteenth-century set the stage for the conflict-filled twentieth-century, as nationalist sentiment inspired European countries to come to terms with their national aspirations and desire to establish vast empires. The changes wrought by these revolutions, therefore, truly resulted in the fundamental transformation of Europe.
Further Reading
Review: Charles Breunig's The Age of Revolution and Reaction, 1789-1850 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970).
Review: Anna Clark's The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).
Review: Mark Cocker's Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe’s Conquest of Indigenous Peoples (New York: Grove Press, 1998).
Review: Marc Raeff's Understanding Imperial Russia: State and Society in the Old Regime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
Works Cited:
Books / Articles:
Breunig, Charles. The Age of Revolution and Reaction, 1789-1850 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970).
Clark, Anna. The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).
Cocker, Mark. Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe’s Conquest of Indigenous Peoples (New York: Grove Press, 1998).
Hull, Isabel. Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (London: Cornell University Press, 2005).
Raeff, Marc. Understanding Imperial Russia: State and Society in the Old Regime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
Rich, Norman. The Age of Nationalism and Reform, 1850-1890 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977).
Images / Photographs:
A brief summary of industrialization in France during the nineteenth century. Accessed August 02, 2017. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/courses/rschwart/hist255/la/industrialization.html.
"British Empire." Jama Masjid, Delhi - New World Encyclopedia. Accessed June 05, 2018. http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/British_Empire.
"History of Europe." Encyclopædia Britannica. Accessed August 02, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Europe.
History.com Staff. "Napoleon Bonaparte." History.com. 2009. Accessed August 02, 2017. http://www.history.com/topics/napoleon.
Wikipedia contributors, "Industrial Revolution," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Industrial_Revolution&oldid=843485379 (accessed June 5, 2018).
This content is accurate and true to the best of the author’s knowledge and is not meant to substitute for formal and individualized advice from a qualified professional.
© 2017 Larry Slawson
Comments
Larry Slawson (author) from North Carolina on August 02, 2019:
I agree Denise! Its hard to say. But I think industrialization certainly aided with the revolutionary process if you look at the social issues it created across Europe.
Denise McGill from Fresno CA on August 01, 2019:
It is such a lot to take in. So many things precipitated other things, cause and effect. Do you think without industrialization there would have been no revolution?
Denise
aadesh tikhe on February 26, 2019:
when the information was published
sulaiman_bashir on May 01, 2018:
@Eric D, it's ansurb to think on a platform like this that revoultion means just a change as you have comceived in your comments. Revolution is multifaceted and multidimensional in its scope. It may cometh slow or rather sudden and spontaneous defending on the scale and circumstances prevailing at the material time. So, broaden your mind to not just the words used to describe a process or situation but also have a regard as to the context in which they are used. Thank you.
Eric Dierker from Spring Valley, CA. U.S.A. on August 03, 2017:
Semantics are terribly hard in philosophical and historical discussion. I just cannot cotton taking "revolution" out of the minds of the plenty and defining it as a "change in direction" even though it fits a construct to put forward a political/historical base. That is very much ivory tower thinking. Carter to Reagan was not a revolution. It was a change.
10o,000 bodies is a revolution. And yet of course our earth turns at so many revolutions per minute.
Once your premise is wrong your thesis becomes faulty. Change does not equal revolution.
https://www.historyextra.com/period/victorian/inside-19th-century-slums-new-york/
Costs of the 20-year war on terror: $8 trillion and 900,000 deaths
A report from the Costs of War project at Brown University revealed that 20 years of post-9/11 wars have cost the U.S. an estimated $8 trillion and have killed more than 900,000 people.
PROVIDENCE, R.I. [Brown University] — Nearly 20 years after the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan, the cost of its global war on terror stands at $8 trillion and 900,000 deaths, according to a new report from the Costs of War project at Brown University.
The Costs of War project, founded more than a decade ago at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs and co-directed by two Brown scholars, released its influential annual report ahead of the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, the impetus for an ongoing American effort to root out terrorism in the Middle East and beyond.
Stephanie Savell, Catherine Lutz and Neta CrawfordThe Costs of War project is co-directed by Stephanie Savell (left), Catherine Lutz (center) and Neta Crawford (right).
“The war has been long and complex and horrific and unsuccessful... and the war continues in over 80 countries,” said Catherine Lutz, co-director of Costs of War and a professor of international and public affairs at Brown, during a virtual event hosted by the Watson Institute on Wednesday, Sept. 1. “The Pentagon and the U.S. military have now absorbed the great majority of the federal discretionary budget, and most people don’t know that. Our task, now and in future years, is to educate the public on the ways in which we fund those wars and the scale of that funding.”
The research team’s $8 trillion estimate accounts for all direct costs of the country’s post-9/11 wars, including Department of Defense Overseas Contingency Operations funding; State Department war expenditures and counterterror war-related costs, including war-related increases to the Pentagon’s base budget; care for veterans to date and in the future; Department of Homeland Security spending; and interest payments on borrowing for these wars. The total includes funds that the Biden administration requested in May 2021.
The death toll, standing at an estimated 897,000 to 929,000, includes U.S. military members, allied fighters, opposition fighters, civilians, journalists and humanitarian aid workers who were killed as a direct result of war, whether by bombs, bullets or fire. It does not, the researchers noted, include the many indirect deaths the war on terror has caused by way of disease, displacement and loss of access to food or clean drinking water.
“The deaths we tallied are likely a vast undercount of the true toll these wars have taken on human life,” said Neta Crawford, a co-founder of the project and a professor of political science at Boston University. “It’s critical we properly account for the vast and varied consequences of the many U.S. wars and counterterror operations since 9/11, as we pause and reflect on all of the lives lost.”
“ Twenty years from now, we’ll still be reckoning with the high societal costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars — long after U.S. forces are gone. ”
Stephanie Savell Co-director, Costs of War project
The report comes at the end of a contentious U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, where Taliban insurgents captured every major city and seized governmental control as American military units worked to extract 123,000 troops, diplomats and allies. Of the $8 trillion, $2.3 trillion is attributed to the Afghanistan/Pakistan war zone, according to the report.
In an address to the nation on Tuesday, Aug. 31, President Joe Biden cited Costs of War estimates to convey the financial and human burden of the 20-year war in Afghanistan as he defended his decision to withdraw from the country.
“We no longer had a clear purpose in an open-ended mission in Afghanistan,” Biden said. “After more than $2 trillion spent in Afghanistan, costs that Brown University researchers estimated would be over $300 million a day for 20 years — yes, the American people should hear this... what have we lost as a consequence, in terms of opportunities? ...I refuse to send America’s sons and daughters to fight a war that should have ended long ago.”
Even as the U.S. exits Afghanistan, Costs of War estimates show that Americans are far from done paying the bill on the war on terror, which continues across multiple continents. The cumulative cost of military intervention in the Iraq/Syria war zone has risen to $2.1 trillion since 9/11, and about $355 billion more has funded military presence in other countries, including Somalia and a handful of African countries.
And when the wars do end, the costs of war will continue to rise, the report notes: A towering $2.2 trillion of the estimated financial total accounts for future care that has already been set aside for military veterans, the researchers said, and the U.S. and other countries could pay the cost of environmental damage wrought by the wars for generations to come.
“What have we truly accomplished in 20 years of post-9/11 wars and at what price?” said Stephanie Savell, co-director of the Costs of War Project and a senior research associate at the Watson Institute. “Twenty years from now, we’ll still be reckoning with the high societal costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars — long after U.S. forces are gone.”
The Watson Institute’s virtual event included commentary from multiple researchers associated with the Costs of War Project, U.S. Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., and U.S. Reps. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., David Cicilline, D-R.I., and Ro Khanna, D-Calif. It was moderated by Murtaza Hussain, a national security reporter at the Intercept.
The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, can be considered a watershed moment in the 21st Century. Its importance in defining the future course of global events is, perhaps, on par with the Russian revolution or the fall of Nazi Germany and atomic annihilation of Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
Two major wars, interventions by the US and NATO in numerous other countries, rise of new terror outfits and new geopolitical alliances and rivalries have marked the responses to 9/11 in the past 20 years.
In 2010, a group of scholars at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University in Rhode Island began work to chronicle the costs of the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and related violence in Pakistan and Syria. The team, called 'The Costs of War Project', recently released figures of the costs incurred by the US and others in responding to 9/11.
The budgetary costs of the post-9/11 wars incurred by the US federal government was estimated by The Costs of War team to be over $8 trillion. Successive US governments, including the Joe Biden administration, have sought $5.8 trillion to react to the 9/11 attacks. This includes expenditure on war zones, homeland security and interest payments on war borrowing.
"The research team’s $8 trillion estimate accounts for all direct costs of the country’s post-9/11 wars, including Department of Defense Overseas Contingency Operations funding; State Department war expenditures and counterterror war-related costs, including war-related increases to the Pentagon’s base budget; care for veterans to date and in the future; Department of Homeland Security spending; and interest payments on borrowing for these wars," Brown University said in a statement.
Future medical care and disability payments for veterans would likely exceed $2.2 trillion, according to The Costs of War project, making for a figure of about $8 trillion in current dollars. The Costs of War project noted the figure of $8 trillion does not include the money spent on humanitarian assistance and development in Afghanistan and Iraq or expenditure by US allies.
Death toll
The Costs of War project notes the death toll in the wars after 9/11 is between 897,000 to 929,000 people. This includes "US military members, allied fighters, opposition fighters, civilians, journalists and humanitarian aid workers who were killed as a direct result of war, whether by bombs, bullets or fire".
also read
From Kochi to Ranchi, NIA avoids controversies over federal rights
'Cheap, small arms becoming weapon of choice of terror groups'
US kills top al-Qaeda leader Qasim al-Rimi in Yemen: Trump
Pakistan bans 11 groups for having links with JuD, JeM terror groups
A total of 7,052 US military personnel have died in the post-9/11 conflicts, with Iraq (4,598 deaths) and Afghanistan (2,324) accounting for the most fatalities. Highlighting the role played by private 'contractors' in the conflicts, a total of 8,189 contractors have lost their lives in these conflicts. Again, Afghanistan (3,917 deaths) and Iraq (3,650) account for the most fatalities.
Civilians account for the largest category of deaths. Civilian fatalities are estimated to be between 363,939 to 387,072, with Iraq accounting for approximately 208,964 deaths, the highest figure for a single country.
Refugees
The post-9/11 conflicts have led to around 38 million people being displaced. Since 2001, 5.9 million people have been displaced in Afghanistan and 3.7 million in Pakistan. Over 9 million people have been displaced in Iraq since 2003, while over 7.1 million have been displaced in Syria since 2014.
The Costs of War project states this figure exceeds people displaced in all conflicts since 1900, with the exception of the Second World War. The researchers caution the figure of 38 million is a "conservative" estimate, noting the the actual number could be closer to 49 million-60 million, rivalling the refugee numbers seen in the Second World War.
On September 10, 2001, then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld disclosed that his department was unable to account for roughly $2.3 trillion worth of transactions. The next day, the U.S. sustained the terrorist attacks that changed the world, and this startling revelation was forgotten.
When an account discrepancy occurs that cannot be traced, it’s customary to make what is called an “un-documentable adjustment.” This is similar to when your checkbook balance is off by, say, ten dollars; you add or subtract that amount to make everything balance with the bank. In 1999, the amount that the Pentagon adjusted was eight times the Defense Department budget for that year; it was one-third greater than the entire federal budget.
By 2015, the amount reported missing by the Office of the Inspector General had increased to $6.5 trillion—and that was just for the army. Using public data from federal databases, Mark Skidmore, a professor of economics at Michigan State University, found that $21 trillion in unsupported adjustments had been reported by the Defense and Housing and Urban Development departments between 1998 and 2015. That’s about $65,000 for every American.
There is no sign that the government’s internal auditors have made much headway in finding the missing money. Jim Minnery of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service traveled the country in 2002 looking for documents on just $300 million worth of unrecorded spending. “We know it’s gone. But we don’t know what they spent it on,” he said. He was reassigned after suggesting that higher-ups covered up the problem by writing it off. He’s not the only who thinks so. “The books are cooked routinely year after year,” says former defense analyst Franklin C. Spinney.
According to a 2013 Reuters report, the Pentagon is the only federal agency that has not complied with a 1996 law that requires annual audits of all government departments. The Pentagon has spent tens of billions of dollars to upgrade to more efficient technology in order to become audit-ready. But many of these new systems have failed and been scrapped.
Predictably, the government did not race to correct the problem even after investigators sounded the alarm. Skidmore contacted the Office of the Inspector General but was not permitted to speak to anyone who had worked on the corruption report. Both the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office assured him that congressional hearings would have been held if there was a significant problem. When Rumsfeld eventually did appear before Congress in March 2005, his testimony offered no substantive answers.
In short: the military doesn’t know how its budget is being spent. The “total military expenditures” that analysts so confidently cite are whatever the Treasury Department says they are, and the individual line items, at least for the army, are for the most part unknown. If money is being diverted from the armed forces, the losses are degrading our defense capability in ways difficult to observe. The same is true on a smaller scale for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, where billions in missing expenditures could have gone to support the perennially cash-strapped federal mortgage-loan program, and possibly other unrelated programs, without congressional knowledge or approval.
Though each passing year diminishes the likelihood that already-disbursed funds will be tracked down, Americans should insist on a renewed effort to rein in future discrepancies. The Trump presidency presents a fresh chance to prioritize accountability, and the president campaigned on robust military spending and reducing government waste. With congressional cooperation, the president should ask the secretaries of the Departments of Defense and of Housing and Urban Development to testify about any misplaced spending, and commission new independent audits of their expenses. This ongoing mismanagement of the public trust—and public dollars—is possibly the greatest silent scandal in America today.
If it were measured as a country, then cybercrime — which is predicted to inflict damages totaling $6 trillion USD globally in 2021 — would be the world’s third-largest economy after the U.S. and China.
Cybersecurity Ventures expects global cybercrime costs to grow by 15 percent per year over the next five years, reaching $10.5 trillion USD annually by 2025, up from $3 trillion USD in 2015. This represents the greatest transfer of economic wealth in history, risks the incentives for innovation and investment, is exponentially larger than the damage inflicted from natural disasters in a year, and will be more profitable than the global trade of all major illegal drugs combined.
The damage cost estimation is based on historical cybercrime figures including recent year-over-year growth, a dramatic increase in hostile nation-state sponsored and organized crime gang hacking activities, and a cyberattack surface which will be an order of magnitude greater in 2025 than it is today.
Cybercrime costs include damage and destruction of data, stolen money, lost productivity, theft of intellectual property, theft of personal and financial data, embezzlement, fraud, post-attack disruption to the normal course of business, forensic investigation, restoration and deletion of hacked data and systems, and reputational harm.
The United States, the world’s largest economy with a nominal GDP of nearly $21.5 trillion, constitutes one-fourth of the world economy, according to data from Nasdaq.
Cybercrime has hit the U.S. so hard that in 2018 a supervisory special agent with the FBI who investigates cyber intrusions told The Wall Street Journal that every American citizen should expect that all of their data (personally identifiable information) has been stolen and is on the dark web — a part of the deep web — which is intentionally hidden and used to conceal and promote heinous activities. Some estimates put the size of the deep web (which is not indexed or accessible by search engines) at as much as 5,000 times larger than the surface web, and growing at a rate that defies quantification.
The dark web is also where cybercriminals buy and sell malware, exploit kits, and cyberattack services, which they use to strike victims — including businesses, governments, utilities, and essential service providers on U.S. soil.
A cyberattack could potentially disable the economy of a city, state or our entire country.
In his 2016 New York Times bestseller — Lights Out: A Cyberattack, A Nation Unprepared, Surviving the Aftermath — Ted Koppel reveals that a major cyberattack on America’s power grid is not only possible but likely, that it would be devastating, and that the U.S. is shockingly unprepared.
Billionaire businessman and philanthropist Warren Buffet calls cybercrime the number one problem with mankind, and cyberattacks a bigger threat to humanity than nuclear weapons.
A bullseye is squarely on our nation’s businesses.
Organized cybercrime entities are joining forces, and their likelihood of detection and prosecution is estimated to be as low as 0.05 percent in the U.S., according to the World Economic Forum’s 2020 Global Risk Report.
RANSOMWARE
Ransomware — a malware that infects computers (and mobile devices) and restricts their access to files, often threatening permanent data destruction unless a ransom is paid — has reached epidemic proportions globally and is the “go-to method of attack” for cybercriminals.
A 2017 report from Cybersecurity Ventures predicted ransomware damages would cost the world $5 billion in 2017, up from $325 million in 2015 — a 15X increase in just two years. The damages for 2018 were estimated at $8 billion, and for 2019 the figure rose to $11.5 billion.
The latest forecast is for global ransomware damage costs to reach $20 billion by 2021 — which is 57X more than it was in 2015.
We predict there will be a ransomware attack on businesses every 11 seconds by 2021, up from every 40 seconds in 2016.
The FBI is particularly concerned with ransomware hitting healthcare providers, hospitals, 911 and first responders. These types of cyberattacks can impact the physical safety of American citizens, and this is the forefront of what Herb Stapleton, FBI cyber division section chief, and his team are focused on.
Last month, ransomware claimed its first life. German authorities reported a ransomware attack caused the failure of IT systems at a major hospital in Duesseldorf, and a woman who needed urgent admission died after she had to be taken to another city for treatment.
Ransomware, now the fastest growing and one of the most damaging types of cybercrime, will ultimately convince senior executives to take the cyber threat more seriously, according to Mark Montgomery, executive director at the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) — but he hopes it doesn’t come to that.
CYBER ATTACK SURFACE
The modern definition of the word “hack” was coined at MIT in April 1955. The first known mention of computer (phone) hacking occurred in a 1963 issue of The Tech. Over the past fifty-plus years, the world’s attack surface has evolved from phone systems to a vast datasphere outpacing humanity’s ability to secure it.
In 2013, IBM proclaimed data promises to be for the 21st century what steam power was for the 18th, electricity for the 19th and hydrocarbons for the 20th.
“We believe that data is the phenomenon of our time,” said Ginni Rometty, IBM Corp.’s executive chairman, in 2015, addressing CEOs, CIOs and CISOs from 123 companies in 24 industries at a conference in New York City. “It is the world’s new natural resource. It is the new basis of competitive advantage, and it is transforming every profession and industry. If all of this is true — even inevitable — then cyber crime, by definition, is the greatest threat to every profession, every industry, every company in the world.”
The world will store 200 zettabytes of data by 2025, according to Cybersecurity Ventures. This includes data stored on private and public IT infrastructures, on utility infrastructures, on private and public cloud data centers, on personal computing devices — PCs, laptops, tablets, and smartphones — and on IoT (Internet-of-Things) devices.
As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, nearly half the U.S. labor force is working from home, according to Stanford University. As employees generate, access, and share more data remotely through cloud apps, the number of security blind spots balloons.
It’s predicted that the total amount of data stored in the cloud — which includes public clouds operated by vendors and social media companies (think Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, etc.), government-owned clouds that are accessible to citizens and businesses, private clouds owned by mid-to-large-sized corporations, and cloud storage providers — will reach 100 zettabytes by 2025, or 50 percent of the world’s data at that time, up from approximately 25 percent stored in the cloud in 2015.
Roughly one million more people join the internet every day. We expect there will be 6 billion people connected to the internet interacting with data in 2022, up from 5 billion in 2020 — and more than 7.5 billion internet users in 2030.
Cyber threats have expanded from targeting and harming computers, networks, and smartphones — to people, cars, railways, planes, power grids and anything with a heartbeat or an electronic pulse. Many of these Things are connected to corporate networks in some fashion, further complicating cybersecurity.
By 2023, there will be 3X more networked devices on Earth than humans, according to a report from Cisco. And by 2022, 1 trillion networked sensors will be embedded in the world around us, with up to 45 trillion in 20 years.
IP traffic has reached an annual run rate of 2.3 zettabytes in 2020, up from an annual run rate of 870.3 exabytes in 2015.
Data is the building block of the digitized economy, and the opportunities for innovation and malice around it are incalculable.
CYBERSECURITY SPENDING
In 2004, the global cybersecurity market was worth $3.5 billion — and in 2017 it was worth more than $120 billion. The cybersecurity market grew by roughly 35X during that 13-year period — prior to the latest market sizing by Cybersecurity Ventures.
Global spending on cybersecurity products and services for defending against cybercrime is projected to exceed $1 trillion cumulatively over the five-year period from 2017 to 2021.
“Most cybersecurity budgets at U.S. organizations are increasing linearly or flat, but the cyberattacks are growing exponentially,” says CSC’s Montgomery. This simple observation should be a wake-up call for C-suite executives.
Healthcare has lagged behind other industries and the tantalizing target on its back is attributable to outdated IT systems, fewer cybersecurity protocols and IT staff, extremely valuable data, and the pressing need for medical practices and hospitals to pay ransoms quickly to regain data. The healthcare industry will respond by spending $125 billion cumulatively from 2020 to 2025 to beef up its cyber defenses.
The FY 2020 U.S. President’s Budget includes $17.4 billion of budget authority for cybersecurity-related activities, a $790 million (5 percent) increase above the FY 2019 estimate, according to The White House. Due to the sensitive nature of some activities, this amount does not represent the entire cyber budget.
Cybersecurity Ventures anticipates 12-15 percent year-over-year cybersecurity market growth through 2025. While that may be a respectable increase, it pales in comparison to the cybercrime costs incurred.
SMALL BUSINESS
“There are 30 million small businesses in the U.S. that need to stay safe from phishing attacks, malware spying, ransomware, identity theft, major breaches and hackers who would compromise their security,” says Scott Schober, author of the popular books “Hacked Again” and “Cybersecurity Is Everybody’s Business.”
More than half of all cyberattacks are committed against small-to-midsized businesses (SMBs), and 60 percent of them go out of business within six months of falling victim to a data breach or hack.
66 percent of SMBs had at least one cyber incident in the past two years, according to Mastercard.
“Small and medium sized businesses lack the financial resources and skill set to combat the emerging cyber threat,” says Scott E. Augenbaum, former supervisory special agent at the FBI’s Cyber Division, Cyber Crime Fraud Unit, where he was responsible for managing the FBI’s Cyber Task Force Program and Intellectual Property Rights Program.
A Better Business Bureau survey found that for small businesses — which make up more than 97 percent of total businesses in North America — the primary challenges for more than 55 percent of them in order to develop a cybersecurity plan are a lack of resources or knowledge.
Ransomware attacks are of particular concern. “The cost of ransomware has skyrocketed and that’s a huge concern for small businesses — and it doesn’t look like there’s any end in sight,” adds Schober.
AI AUGMENTS CYBER DEFENDERS
You don’t bring a knife to a gunfight.
The U.S. has a total employed cybersecurity workforce consisting of nearly 925,000 people, and there are currently almost 510,000 unfilled positions, according to Cyber Seek, a project supported by the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), a program of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Faced with a domestic worker shortage, the heads of U.S. cyber defense forces — CIOs and CISOs at America’s mid-sized to largest businesses — are beginning to augment their staff with next-generation AI and ML (machine learning) software and appliances aimed at detecting cyber intruders. These AI systems are trained on big data sets collected over decades — and they can analyze terabytes of data per day, a scale unimaginable for humans.
The panacea for a CISO is an AI system resembling a human expert’s investigative and reporting techniques so that cyber threats are remediated BEFORE the damage is done.
If enemies are using AI to launch cyberattacks, then our country’s businesses need to use AI to defend themselves.
FOR THE BOARDROOM
Cybersecurity begins at the top.
CSC has an urgent message for boardroom and C-suite executives: The status quo in cyberspace is unacceptable, which is spelled out in its groundbreaking 2020 Report which proposes a strategy of layered cyber deterrence — to protect all U.S. businesses and governments from cybercrime and cyberwarfare. But, this is hardly the first warning. “Some of the same things we’re recommending today, we were pushing 23 years ago,” says Montgomery.
Someone should be in the boardroom who will wave the red flag and get everyone else paying attention to the severity of cyber risks. Montgomery says attention is the number one priority, not bringing in a new CISO — instead empower the CISO that you have.
The value of a business depends largely on how well it guards its data, the strength of its cybersecurity, and its level of cyber resilience.
If there’s one takeaway from this report, then let it be this: Don’t let your boardroom be the weakest cybersecurity link.
U.S. BUDGETARY COSTS The vast economic impact of the U.S. post-9/11 wars goes beyond the Pentagon's "Overseas Contigency Operations" (War) budget. This chart and the attached paper estimate the more comprehensive budgetary costs of the wars.
Posted on September 1, 2021
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/BudgetaryCosts
Illustrated advertising cards African stereotypes as foils in order to appeal to white consumers
After decades of presenting the archetypal American consumer as white and female, advertisers are slowly broadening their imagery to include more diversity.
But, as the scholar Marilyn Maness Mehaffy writes, the history of race in American advertisements isn’t just about the absence of non-white buyers.
She argues that the creation of the ideal white, female consumer in the expanding consumer economy of the late nineteenth century depended on the inclusion of women of other races, particularly African-Americans, as a foil.
Mehaffy focuses on illustrated advertising cards. In the late nineteenth century, consumer brands printed the colorful cards to spread awareness of their products. Both children and adults saved the cards, leading to a collector’s craze.
The domestic, white, female consumer is defined in relation to a complementary preindustrial black laborer.
Some cards simply depicted animals, flowers, or landscapes. But one archivist found up to forty percent of the cards in a typical museum collection invoked ethnic stereotypes. In particular, Mehaffy writes, a striking number of illustrated cards depicted a pair of women:
one white and one Black.
In one card advertising cotton thread, for example, a modestly dressed white woman sewing in her chair is juxtaposed with a black woman in short sleeves laboring in a cotton field.
The domestic, white, female consumer is defined in relation to a complementary preindustrial black laborer.
Similarly, Mehaffy notes, a number of the cards depicted a white women, sometimes with her children, at home beside a black servant. One, advertising the Redwood Portable Range, offers a striking contrast between a caricatured black domestic worker with bulging eyes and a statuesque white women in a gown. The servant is evidently an important part of the scene of domestic consumption, offering her employer advice about which stove to buy.
Other cards explicitly tie consumer products to white femininity. A card for Hunter’s Flour & Meal Sifters contrasts “the old way” of sifting flour—illustrated with a black woman laboring over a large sieve—and “the new way”—a white women effortlessly using the modern tool.
A fold-out card advertising the Eclipse Clothes Wringer shows two versions of a scene with a white woman supervising a Black domestic worker doing the wash.
In the first, the servant has her sleeves rolled up and is wringing the clothes out by hand. In the second, the black woman—now using the mechanical clothes wringer—is dressed more primly and is less muscular, with thinner lips and “whiter” features (thought the text still shows her speaking in a caricatured black dialect). The consumer product seems to imply that making the African-American woman more like her white counterpart is an “improvement.”
Mehaffy argues that the contrast between white and black women helped define the role of race in the post-Civil War era, as the country became increasingly industrialized.
Later, images of black people in consumer branding dwindled to a few prominent, and still problematic, characters like Aunt Jemima, leaving advertising a mostly white space through much of the twentieth century.
Imperialism, Revolution, and Industrialization in 19th-Century Europe
Industrialization takes hold in Western Europe
Imperialism, Revolution, and Industrialization in 19th Century Europe Explained
Throughout 19th-century Europe, political and economic forces helped to dramatically alter the European continent that forever changed the countries and people that inhabited them. In less than a century, the absolutist ideals of the Old Regime started to wither away as revolutionary ideals of freedom and democracy attempted to take hold across Europe.
Industrialization, with its powerful economic connections, greatly fueled these revolutions through the development of both social strife and inequality. Moreover, nationalist sentiment and imperialism directly contributed to these changes by promoting racism and competition between the powerful emerging nation-states. As this article seeks to demonstrate, however, revolution, industrialization, and imperialism did not always follow a consistent or steady pattern. Rather, they differed quite significantly depending upon the country and people involved during their progression.
As a result, Europeans experienced uneven and sporadic waves of change across the long nineteenth century. What accounts for these discrepancies? What factors contributed to the differences that each country experienced regarding revolution, industrialization, and imperialism during this era?
Revolution and Nationalism
Revolutions in Europe greatly varied from each country to the next. To understand how they affected nineteenth-century Europe, however, it is important to first define the term, “revolution.” Revolution is a term that conjures up many definitions. Generally speaking, it involves a fundamental shift or change within society that alters the social, political, or economic ideals of a country and its people.
Similarly, historian Norman Rich asserts that the term describes any “transformation” of society that takes place over “a long period of time” (Rich, 1). To be certain, Charles Breunig proclaims that this type of change does not always include a clear “break with the past” (Breunig, xi). Basic elements of the society often remain in the aftermath of revolutions.
The goals, ideals, and beliefs of the people, however, are often forever changed through the revolutionary process. This is precisely the situation that unraveled within Europe during the nineteenth-century and the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.
As Breunig asserts:
“many traditional institutions and ideas persisted through the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras into the age of the Restoration” (Breunig, xi).
While basic tenets of European society and culture remained intact, the liberal ideas unleashed by the French Revolution, nevertheless, served to greatly challenge the established monarchies and aristocracies of Europe.
In their aftermath, these challenges to authority set the stage for future governments more responsible to their people, rather than governments that relied solely on absolute rule.
Moreover, the revolutions of nineteenth-century Europe ushered in democratic virtues of liberty and equality that later evolved into the current models of governance in existence today. With this basic understanding of revolutions and their impact on nineteenth-century Europe, several important questions arise.
What accounted for these revolutionary uprisings?
Specifically, what factors led to their overall development and progression?
Why did differences in the experiences of revolution exist among the countries of Europe? More specifically, why did certain regions of Europe experience change more rapidly than other parts?
The revolutions across Europe directly resulted from the radical views of the French that first emerged during the French Revolution.
In an attempt to dismantle the ideas embraced by the Old Regime, French revolutionaries (inspired by the American Revolution only a few years prior) attacked the social and political ideals of their time in favor of measures that ostensibly favored universal equality and liberty for all.
With the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and his conquests across Europe, these French ideas quickly spread to neighboring regions as country after country fell victim to Napoleon’s powerful army.
This aspect is important to consider, as it helps explain the inconsistencies between Eastern and Western Europe in regard to the revolutions each country experienced.
Western powers with a closer proximity to France, experienced revolution far sooner than the countries of Eastern Europe since their populations existed within the boundaries of French influence.
This influence was further enhanced once Napoleon gained control over Italy, the German states, and portions of Austria-Hungary through his conquests. As part of his rule, Napoleon implemented tremendous changes within these countries, both economically and politically.
The Napoleonic Codes, according to Breunig, destroyed the prior political establishments of these countries, and in their place, implemented policies that mimicked “French institutions” (Breunig, 93).
Because the imperial structure set up by Napoleon destroyed the social and political elements of the Old Regime across Western Europe, Napoleon set the stage for future revolutionary developments within these countries that progressed more rapidly than in places such as Russia.
Napoleon’s conquests also spread ideas of nationalism that emerged from the French Revolution. Nationalism, which reflected ideas of extreme patriotism and pride, played a tremendous role in developing the revolutionary changes that occurred across Europe.
Nationalism provided individuals with an identity, and a connection with people of similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds. By conquering the countries and states surrounding France, Breunig proclaims that Napoleon, inadvertently, “contributed to a greater sense of unity” among those he conquered, particularly within the Italian and German states (Breunig, 94).
Through his harsh and dictatorial rule, Napoleon aroused “patriotic resentment among the peoples subjected to French domination” (Breunig, 95). This is important to consider, since these sentiments did not vanish over time.
Even decades after the fall of Napoleon and the French Empire, Breunig asserts that “the seeds sown during the Napoleonic era bore fruit in the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century” (Breunig, 95).
This case is greatly illustrated by the German states during the middle years of the nineteenth-century. Although Germany did not form into a collective nation-state until the time of Bismarck, Breunig proclaims that discontent in the 1840s helped invigorate the patriotic seeds first sown by Napoleon into “a wave of popular discontent” across the German states, particularly within Prussia (Breunig, 238).
For these reasons, Western Europe experienced upheavals of their political and social systems far sooner than the countries of the East.
These disruptions and encouragement of nationalist sentiment, consequently, aided in the development of revolutionary thoughts long before such ideas emerged in the East. Distance, in this sense, greatly explains the revolutionary incongruities that existed throughout Europe during the nineteenth-century. Eastern countries remained far removed from the dissent fomenting in the West.
Moreover, distance gave the Eastern rulers ample time to implement measures capable of stifling and muting future dissenters, thus, preventing revolutionary reactions within their own countries.
According to Marc Raeff, Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, “worked hard to prevent Western liberal ideas from gaining a foothold with the educated public” (Raeff, 148).
As he states:
“censorship was extremely severe: anything suspicious or capable of being interpreted as adverse criticism of the existing state of affairs was proscribed” (Raeff, 148). Not surprisingly, such tactics and actions helped to greatly delay radical Western ideas from permeating the Russian empire.
Nevertheless, Western elements of revolution and nationalism did eventually infiltrate the East during Napoleon’s invasion of the Russian Empire. Similar to his conquests in the West, Napoleon inadvertently introduced concepts of the French Revolution to the vast forces he encountered. Therefore, understanding Napoleon’s impact is important because it helps to explain multiple aspects about revolutions in Europe.
Not only does it demonstrate why an unevenness of revolutions existed within Europe, but it also explains the root causes of nationalism and why nationalist sentiment spread beyond the French boundaries to impact European societies at large.
The revolutionary and nationalist sentiments introduced by Napoleon, in turn, aided in the disruption of the balance of power across Europe, and directly resulted in the tense military and political atmosphere that emerged following the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
Political and institutional changes, however, are not the only revolutions that took place across Europe. Industrialization, to a large degree, brought economic change to Europe on a scale never before seen. Just as the political revolutions of Europe varied from country to country, so too did the forces of industrialization that favored particular social, economic, and political environments over others.
Industrialization
According to Charles Breunig, the Industrial Revolution “transformed the lives of Europeans even more thoroughly than did the French Revolution” (Breunig, xii). But what factors contributed to its impact? According to Norman Rich, advancements in agriculture served as a major contributor to industrialization since it resulted in “greater availability of food in Europe,” and aided in the growth of population across the continent (Rich, 15).
This growth in population was important since it assisted in the development of cities and provided a consumer market to meet the large-scale production capabilities of industry. Revolutions in transportation and technology, such as the railroad and steamboat, further aided the development of industrialization since they provided a means for consumer goods to be shipped in mass quantities quickly and cost-effectively, across long distances.
As Rich states:
“the railroads made possible…the large-scale, economical, and rapid distribution of goods overland, they penetrated the remote interiors of countries and continents and opened up the markets of these regions to industry while giving agricultural regions access to urban markets” (Rich, 9).
Similar to the political revolutions taking place across Europe, industrialization varied greatly across the European continent. In Great Britain, for instance, the effects of industrialization were, perhaps, most recognizable since the British Empire fostered an atmosphere conducive to industry and its effects.
With an empire that stretched the globe, Britain possessed a large and diverse population, as well as a vast consumer market that helped stimulate the production of mass quantities of goods. Furthermore, Charles Breunig asserts that part of the intensity with Britain’s industrialization lies with the fact that its empire possessed large quantities of “raw materials,” a large quantity of “capital for investment,” and “surplus labor” sources that did not exist on this scale within the rest of the European continent (Breunig, 198-199).
According to historian, Anna Clark, however, the Industrial Revolution also created as many problems as it solved in Great Britain. This is particularly true if the social impact of the revolution is taken into account.
While the Industrial Revolution provided many individuals with jobs and an abundance of goods, Clark asserts that it also served to create social strife and gender inequality, and greatly expanded the divide between social classes (Clark, 269-270).
As she states:
“the social changes of industrialization drove up illegitimacy rates between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth century, and wife desertion and bigamy seemed all to frequent” (Clark, 6).
Moreover, while Clark asserts that the “new opportunities” created by the Industrial Revolution “lessened poverty,” they also “increased divisions between men and women, as men worked in heavy industry and women either found jobs in the declining textile industry or stayed at home” (Clark, 270). Problems such as these greatly helped fuel the social and political revolutions taking place across Britain, and eventually Europe, at large.
Consequently, the social strife created by industry resulted in many of the problems seen in the last half of the nineteenth-century, particularly within Russia and the eventual Soviet Union.
Industrialization within France and Austria also provided similar effects, although not nearly as pronounced as the British example. According to Breunig, industrialization greatly aided in the modernization efforts within France.
However, as he states, their “persistence of a system of small landholding” greatly “handicapped the development of industry” when compared with Great Britain (Breunig, 199).
In regard to Austria, Norman Rich explains: “the industrial revolution brought to Austria the usual problems of city growth…but it also brought wealth and prosperity to a large section of the population and created a new middle class” (Rich, 106).
Like the other continental countries, however, Austria faced material shortages and a smaller-scale consumer market that paled in comparison to Great Britain.
Eastern Europe and Russia, in particular, did not experience the full effects of industrialization like Great Britain, France, and Austria until later into the nineteenth-century.
With its isolated position in Europe, Russia once again possessed a natural barrier to many of the changes sweeping across the continent.
Many of the institutions and policies of Russian governance continued to reflect the absolutist ideals espoused by the Old Regime, even into the twentieth-century. Serfdom, which amounted to basic elements of slavery, continued unabated until the 1860s in Russia.
As a result of this dependence on agriculture and the labor of serfs, Russia did not begin its modernization and industrialization policies until the late nineteenth-century (well after the industrial revolutions of Western Europe).
Fearful of encroachment and destruction by the hands of the Western powers, Russia sought to catch up to the industrialized and technologically advanced West only because its national interests were at stake.
With the unification and militarization of Germany during the 1860s and 1870s, such fears do not appear erroneous, especially when the aggressiveness of German military policies are taken into account.
The failure of Russia to industrialize later, rather than sooner, created many problems for the Russian Empire as it attempted to transition too quickly from an agricultural-based society to industry.
By diverting their attention away from agriculture too rapidly, the Russian Empire experienced social strife and economic problems that eventually led to its downfall, following World War I.
As seen, industrialization varied greatly between the powers of Europe since it required multiple factors for its success.
Nevertheless, its effects greatly impacted the European continent in a profound manner through the tremendous innovations it inspired in both technology and production. As a result, Europe advanced faster and more quickly than at any other time period in its history.
More importantly, however, industrialization helped cultivate and contribute to the rising social and political strife originally inspired by the French Revolution. Through its creation of imbalances in social class, gender, and wealth, industrialization helped set the stage for many of the social problems that existed in the latter part of the nineteenth-century that continued well into the twentieth-century as well.
Imperialism
Similar to the political, social, and industrial revolutions, discrepancies in the policies of imperialism varied across Europe as well. Ostensibly, imperialism expanded and grew as a result of the European desire to spread Christianity to the so-called heathen societies of the world, and as a means to bring civilization to the undeveloped tribes and clans of the globe.
As Mark Cocker asserts: Europeans believed “Christian civilization was the obvious apex and terminal point to which all mankind must inexorably aspire” (Cocker, 14). More often than not, however, imperial sentiments derived from a deeply racist view of indigenous people whom the Europeans viewed as inferior to their culture and way of life.
Because native traditions and practices did not reflect Christian elements of Europe, Cocker asserts that Europeans often viewed tribal societies as “subhuman” animals that lived outside “the margins of civilization” (Cocker, 13).
Imperialism also derived from a desire to acquire greater resources and raw materials for the various European economies.
In this essence, imperialism emerged, in some aspects, as a direct result of the industrial revolutions taking place across Europe during the nineteenth-century. Elements of nationalism also served to fortify imperialism, and greatly inspired the desires for global colonization.
Nationalism, with its ideas of patriotism and ethnic superiority, contributed to imperial ideas since it inspired competition among Europeans who desired greater national glory and pride.
The spirit of nationalism and imperialism, combined, prompted Europeans to expand their influence and territory through the domination of foreign lands and people. By scrambling to the far corners of the world to establish colonies, such ambitions aided in the construction of vast empires meant to compete with and overshadow rival European countries.
The creation of these empires resulted in immense competition and conflict between the Europeans that directly contributed to the intricate alliance systems of the late nineteenth-century, and the eventual outbreak of World War I in 1914.
Because of these competitive aspects, historian Isabel Hull states, “imperialism was war” (Hull, 332).
Not surprisingly, the ambitions for colonies and empires were not well founded, as the colonies cost far more to maintain than their actual worth. The brutal subjugation of foreign subjects further exacerbated these problems since these policies were often met with fierce resistance from locals who aimed to disrupt and harass the conquering European powers.
As a result of these problems, Europeans approached the issues of colonization in many of the same ways. Large-scale exterminations, mass-reprisals, and brutality all figured into the European methods of dealing with unruly natives. Nevertheless, some countries implemented more extreme measures than others for the sake of showing their military might and demonstrating their power to effectively control their subjects.
As Hull states, part of the prestige in possessing an empire is the ability to maintain order and discipline. When rebellions by natives succeeded, however, it “exposed the weaknesses of the colonizers” to their European rivals (Hull, 332). This element of imperialism is important to understand, as it helps to explain the different ways that European countries explored and experienced colonization in the nineteenth-century.
While a large portion of the European powers scrambled to take possession of colonies across the world, both Great Britain and France took control of the most colonies due to their economic and military strengths (Cocker, 284). Great Britain, with its tremendous naval power and global empire, was perhaps best suited for imperial endeavors, as it possessed the financial and military means to subjugate large foreign populations with relative ease.
Countries such as Belgium, Italy, and Germany, however, all experienced imperialism on a far different and smaller scale as they each struggled greatly to maintain security over their lesser territories. Because of this reason, smaller countries like Germany, which unified under Bismarck in the 1860s and 1870s, were forced to counter these setbacks through the implementation of brutal and often extreme tactics over their colonial subjects.
These tactics, largely similar to the British treatment of Aborigines in Tasmania and Australia, helped Germany maintain its status as a world power at the expense of the native Herero people of Southwest Africa.
The German example is particularly interesting since their imperial ambitions involved a level of aggressiveness not easily matched by the other European countries. More importantly, however, the German example also provides an excellent illustration of the differences, and long-term effects that imperialism had on Europe. Of particular interest is the point made by Isabel Hull regarding future conflicts in Europe.
Hull makes the point that German aggression in Southwest Africa directly resulted from its extreme military culture that pervaded all elements of its society. With no social and political oversight, the German military, essentially, acted without any real constraints on its power (Hull, 332). Thus, as a result of their success with colonization during the nineteenth-century, Hull asserts that the military extremism developed from imperialism helped inspire German aggression for World War I only a few decades later (Hull, 237).
Such ambitions, in turn, led to Germany’s ultimate destruction in the waning moments of the First World War. These ambitions are not strictly limited to Germany either. In one form or another, imperialism directly influenced future warfare and aggression of the other European powers as well, and contributed greatly to the tumultuous and conflict-driven twentieth-century.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the revolutions of the nineteenth-century dramatically transformed Europe’s social, political, and economic spectrums in a profound manner. While they certainly varied across the continent in their intensity and overall impact, all of Europe eventually succumbed to forces that destroyed the ideals of the Old Regime. As a result of the changes in politics and economics, the revolutions of the nineteenth-century set the stage for the conflict-filled twentieth-century, as nationalist sentiment inspired European countries to come to terms with their national aspirations and desire to establish vast empires. The changes wrought by these revolutions, therefore, truly resulted in the fundamental transformation of Europe.
Further Reading
Review: Charles Breunig's The Age of Revolution and Reaction, 1789-1850 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970).
Review: Anna Clark's The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).
Review: Mark Cocker's Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe’s Conquest of Indigenous Peoples (New York: Grove Press, 1998).
Review: Marc Raeff's Understanding Imperial Russia: State and Society in the Old Regime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
Works Cited:
Books / Articles:
Breunig, Charles. The Age of Revolution and Reaction, 1789-1850 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970).
Clark, Anna. The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).
Cocker, Mark. Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe’s Conquest of Indigenous Peoples (New York: Grove Press, 1998).
Hull, Isabel. Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (London: Cornell University Press, 2005).
Raeff, Marc. Understanding Imperial Russia: State and Society in the Old Regime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
Rich, Norman. The Age of Nationalism and Reform, 1850-1890 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977).
Images / Photographs:
A brief summary of industrialization in France during the nineteenth century. Accessed August 02, 2017. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/courses/rschwart/hist255/la/industrialization.html.
"British Empire." Jama Masjid, Delhi - New World Encyclopedia. Accessed June 05, 2018. http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/British_Empire.
"History of Europe." Encyclopædia Britannica. Accessed August 02, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Europe.
History.com Staff. "Napoleon Bonaparte." History.com. 2009. Accessed August 02, 2017. http://www.history.com/topics/napoleon.
Wikipedia contributors, "Industrial Revolution," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Industrial_Revolution&oldid=843485379 (accessed June 5, 2018).
This content is accurate and true to the best of the author’s knowledge and is not meant to substitute for formal and individualized advice from a qualified professional.
© 2017 Larry Slawson
Comments
Larry Slawson (author) from North Carolina on August 02, 2019:
I agree Denise! Its hard to say. But I think industrialization certainly aided with the revolutionary process if you look at the social issues it created across Europe.
Denise McGill from Fresno CA on August 01, 2019:
It is such a lot to take in. So many things precipitated other things, cause and effect. Do you think without industrialization there would have been no revolution?
Denise
aadesh tikhe on February 26, 2019:
when the information was published
sulaiman_bashir on May 01, 2018:
@Eric D, it's ansurb to think on a platform like this that revoultion means just a change as you have comceived in your comments. Revolution is multifaceted and multidimensional in its scope. It may cometh slow or rather sudden and spontaneous defending on the scale and circumstances prevailing at the material time. So, broaden your mind to not just the words used to describe a process or situation but also have a regard as to the context in which they are used. Thank you.
Eric Dierker from Spring Valley, CA. U.S.A. on August 03, 2017:
Semantics are terribly hard in philosophical and historical discussion. I just cannot cotton taking "revolution" out of the minds of the plenty and defining it as a "change in direction" even though it fits a construct to put forward a political/historical base. That is very much ivory tower thinking. Carter to Reagan was not a revolution. It was a change.
10o,000 bodies is a revolution. And yet of course our earth turns at so many revolutions per minute.
Once your premise is wrong your thesis becomes faulty. Change does not equal revolution.
https://www.historyextra.com/period/victorian/inside-19th-century-slums-new-york/